







Received: 22 November 2020 / Accepted: 3 March 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Experimental philosophy is a relatively recent discipline that employs experimental 
methods to investigate the intuitions, concepts, and assumptions behind traditional 
philosophical arguments, problems, and theories. While experimental philosophy 
initially served to interrogate the role that intuitions play in philosophy, it has since 
branched out to bring empirical methods to bear on problems within a variety of tra-
ditional areas of philosophy—including metaphysics, philosophy of language, phi-
losophy of mind, and epistemology. To date, no connection has been made between 
developments in experimental philosophy and philosophy of technology. In this 
paper, I develop and defend a research program for an experimental philosophy of 
technology.
Keywords Experimental philosophy of technology · Experimental philosophy · 
Philosophy of technology · Ethics of technology · Philosophical method
“Once upon a time there was a world … which was only meant to experi-
ment with this and that, where one could see by trial and error how everything 
turned out, what could be made of it.”
—Pär Lagerkvist (1954), The Experimental World
1 Introduction
Technology is one of the most distinctive and pervasive features of contemporary 
life. Its place in society is only likely to become more prominent and its effects more 
comprehensive. Modern technology has changed our existence—our relationships to 
ourselves, each other, and the world—to such a degree that some have advocated a 
new ethics for the technological age (e.g., Jonas, 1984). In this paper, I introduce a 
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novel methodology for research in philosophy of technology that I call experimental 
philosophy of technology or “techxphi” for short.
The impetus for this approach stems from two observations. First, there has been 
virtually no attention for, let alone systematic study of, the role of intuitions in phi-
losophy of technology or people’s intuitions about technology more generally. The 
recent field of experimental philosophy or “x-phi,” from which experimental philos-
ophy of technology derives its name and methodology, has advanced our knowledge 
about the role of intuitions across a wide range of philosophical disciplines—from 
metaphysics and philosophy of language, to philosophy of mind and epistemology 
(Nichols & Knobe, 2007). To date, however, there has been no attempt to extend this 
approach to topics in philosophy of technology.
Second, the promising role of experimental methods in philosophy of technology 
has been too little appreciated. Despite a growing recognition that empirical methods 
and findings can play an important role in addressing philosophical questions (e.g., 
Appiah, 2008; Hämäläinen, 2016; Plakias, 2015), and notwithstanding the so-called 
empirical turn in philosophy of technology (e.g., Achterhuis, 2001; Scharff, 2011), 
systematic engagement with empirical research has been scarce in philosophy of tech-
nology, especially when compared to other disciplines. For instance, while research 
in experimental ethics has witnessed a proliferation of empirically informed norma-
tive work on a wide range of subjects (e.g., on the nature of character, well-being, and 
the good life), the methodologies and findings from these and related studies have 
rarely been extended to similar issues in ethics of technology. This is perhaps ironic, 
because new technologies have afforded researchers an increasingly rich arsenal of 
experimental research methods. Through advances in virtual and augmented reality, 
for example, people can be more vividly immersed than ever before in the kinds of 
moral dilemmas that are characteristic of experimental ethics (Alfano et al., 2018). 
To experimentally investigate the ways in which people engage with technology itself 
from a philosophical perspective is only a small, but as yet untaken step away.
My main claim in this paper is that experimental philosophy of technology as 
a novel methodology can inform and advance current debates within philosophy 
and ethics of technology, as well as generate new ideas and lines of research in this 
area. More radically, when techxphi flourishes as a research program, some current 
assumptions, arguments, and theories in philosophy of technology will turn out to be 
untenable. My hope is that those who are not persuaded by the more radical implica-
tions of experimental philosophy of technology will nevertheless be convinced by 
its more modest propositions.
I proceed as follows. First, as background, I provide a brief overview of experi-
mental philosophy and the kind of research that has been conducted under its ban-
ner. Second, I develop an outline for an experimental philosophy of technology. I 
address and deflate some potential objections that have been leveled against experi-
mental philosophy generally, which might also be relevant specifically to techxphi. 
I then distinguish two programs of experimental philosophy of technology—a nega-
tive and a positive—and offer examples from classic and more recent research in 
philosophy and ethics of technology to show how techxphi can make unique and sig-
nificant contributions. Finally, I provide several general arguments for the distinctive 
value of experimental philosophy of technology as a methodology for philosophy of 
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technology, and encourage researchers from all fields with an interest in deep ques-
tions about technology to embrace techxphi in a collaborative effort.
2  Experimental Philosophy
Experimental philosophy is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry in which experimental 
methods are employed to investigate questions that are traditionally within the domain of 
philosophy (Knobe et al., 2012). Empirical methods and findings are put to use in order to 
probe and inform philosophical intuitions, assumptions, and concepts. Early experimental 
philosophy can be distinguished by the explicit goal to empirically investigate philosophi-
cal intuitions (see, e.g., Knobe, 2007; Alexander, 2012). As Joshua Alexander and Jonathan 
Weinberg have put it, experimental philosophy is “unified behind a common methodology 
and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of 
the nature of intuitions” (2007, 56). This inquiry was initially prompted by the perceived 
widespread use of intuitions in philosophical theorizing.1 Reliance on intuitions in thought 
experiments and theory building was considered by early proponents of experimental phi-
losophy to be a pervasive feature of philosophical practice and, importantly, it was at the 
same time viewed as a practice subject to potentially problematic limitations (e.g., bias and 
limited generalizability) that could and ought to be tested empirically. To provide an illus-
tration of the kind of work that has been done in this area, especially to familiarize those 
who may not be acquainted with the field, I will summarize a line of experimental philo-
sophical research on the relation between freedom and moral responsibility.
Traditional philosophical discussions about freedom and moral responsibil-
ity have often centered on the assumption that people are natural incompatibilists, 
meaning that they believe that causal determinism is ultimately incompatible with 
either free will or moral responsibility (Alexander, 2012). This assumption has been 
used to place the argumentative burden of proof on philosophical compatibilists 
rather than incompatibilists. However, one might rightfully ask: Are people, in fact, 
natural incompatibilists? In an early and innovative set of studies, Nahmias et  al. 
(2004) empirically investigated this assumption. By showing participants a series of 
vignettes of different scenarios about moral responsibility and free will, they dem-
onstrated that people are actually more likely to be natural compatibilists rather than 
incompatibilists. More concretely, in a study of the so-called Jeremy Cases, Nah-
mias et al. (2005, 566) presented participants with the following scenario:
Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a 
supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current 
state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any 
1 The prevalence of intuitions—and, importantly, of reliance on intuitions—in analytic and other areas 
of philosophy has been a matter of considerable debate. For instance, while Bealer (1996, 1998) has 
argued that philosophical intuitions belong to philosophy’s “standard operating procedure” (1996, 122), 
others like Williamson (2004) and Cappelen (2012, 2014) have argued that philosophy does not rely on 
intuitions as commonly understood. See Deutsch (2015) for an extensive account of the current and com-
plex state of intuitions in (experimental) philosophy. I do not take a stance on this issue here. My scope 
is limited to the role of intuitions in philosophizing about technology, where, as I will argue, these might 
play an important yet underappreciated role.
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future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict eve-
rything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercom-
puter existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 
25, 2150 AD, 20 years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces 
from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidel-
ity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s predic-
tion is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 pm on January 26, 2195.2
They then asked participants to suspend disbelief and to imagine the scenario to be true 
exactly as stated. Importantly, they subsequently asked participants whether they thought that, 
when Jeremy robs the bank, he does so of his own free will. They found that a significant 
majority of participants (76%) judged Jeremy to have robbed the bank of his own free will. 
The normative conclusion that follows for Nahmias and his colleagues is that, if the burden of 
proof should be on anyone, it must be on those who assume people to be natural incompati-
bilists. After all, this is not what their findings suggest about people’s actual beliefs.
Philosophers’ intuitions about people’s basic beliefs, in this case about free will and 
moral responsibility, were thus challenged through empirical findings. Contesting intui-
tions in this way has come to be one of the hallmarks of experimental philosophy. Another 
trend has been to investigate potential differences or biases in these intuitions. Differences 
between philosophical intuitions have been studied, and predictable differences have 
been found, across genders (Buckwalter & Stich, 2014), cultures (Buchtel & Norenzayan, 
2008; Haidt & Joseph, 2007), and personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011).
The main idea behind these findings is that philosophical intuitions are neither stable 
nor uniform across individuals and groups. There are real differences in the kinds of 
intuitions that different people have; and philosophical intuitions are at least sometimes 
sensitive to morally irrelevant features. Moral intuitions were found, for instance, to be 
subject to order effects (Wiegmann et al., 2012), which casts doubt on the stability and 
reliability not just of interpersonal but also of intrapersonal intuitions. As an extension 
of this research, the expertise of professional philosophers, who may be expected to 
have more robust philosophical intuitions, has also been questioned through experimen-
tal means (e.g., Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; see also Weinberg et al., 2010).
These early developments in experimental philosophy, as previously noted, 
focused on the role of intuitions in philosophy; but the field quickly expanded beyond 
primarily considering intuitions.3 A recent description of x-phi, for instance, states 
that its aim is to “systematically collect and analyze empirical data in attempting to 
answer philosophical questions or solve philosophical problems” (Sytsma & Liv-
engood, 2016, 5). So far, research in experimental philosophy4 has covered many 
2 For the sake of clarity, I omit some of the details of the Jeremy Cases as well as the other studies that 
are included by Nahmias et al. (2005).
3 Though the field is no longer restricted to intuitions, and non-intuitional work is being conducted, the 
study of intuitions still plays a dominant role in experiment philosophy (see, e.g., Sytsma & Livengood, 
2016).
4 It should be noted that there is some debate about what precisely should count as experimental phi-
losophy. For instance, ought it to include only the work of those self-consciously active within the field, 
or should the work of non-self-identifying researchers also be embraced? Furthermore, if the latter, then 
what are the criteria that should make it count? See, for an empirical study of philosophers’ views on 
these matters, and for a summary of the debate, Sytsma and Livengood (2016).
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different traditional areas of philosophy, including metaphysics (Nichols & Bruno, 
2010), philosophy of language (Haukioja, 2015; Machery et al., 2004), philosophy of 
mind (Knobe & Prinz, 2008; Sytsma, 2014), intentionality (Knobe, 2010), and epis-
temology (Buckwater, 2010; Feltz & Zarpentine, 2010). Most recently, the case has 
been made for experimental philosophical bioethics or “bioxphi” (Earp et al., 2020).
I believe that it is time for an experimental philosophy of technology. In the 
following sections, I provide a generic account of techxphi and defend it against 
several potential objections. I then outline two different programs for an experi-
mental philosophy of technology, which I develop in connection with some 
recent lines of research in ethics of technology in order to illustrate what the 
programs can offer.
3  Experimental Philosophy of Technology
In the most general terms, experiment philosophy of technology applies the methods 
of experimental philosophy to topics in philosophy of technology. Techxphi involves 
the combination of empirical methods, like the controlled experiments that are char-
acteristic of psychology, neuroscience, and other social sciences, with philosophical 
and normative analysis.5 A flourishing techxphi would mean a truly interdisciplinary 
effort between empirically minded philosophers of technology and cognitive and 
social scientists in order to examine deep questions about technology.6
Before distinguishing between the negative and positive programs of experimental 
philosophy of technology, some objections that have been raised against experimental 
philosophy in the literature need to be discussed.7 This is not the place to fully engage 
with these criticisms; nevertheless, to the extent that some objections to x-phi might 
extend to techxphi, I will briefly discuss (and dispel) three of what I take to be the 
most pressing issues.
First, it has been argued against experimental philosophy that intuitions do not 
play a role in philosophy (e.g., Cappelen, 2012; Deutsch, 2015; Williamson, 2007). 
It appears to me, however, to be much less fruitful to argue for or against the use 
of intuitions in philosophy across the board than to go about it in a more close-
grained way. From a pragmatic point of view, it makes better sense to examine spe-
cific arguments and theories, and then to examine the presence or absence of intui-
tions in these arguments and theories—and only then to criticize or defend the role 
of such intuitions on a case-by-case basis. Given that intuitions in philosophizing 
5 While I am sympathetic to a wider understanding and utilization of empirical methods in philosophy 
generally, for instance as it has been eloquently advocated by Hämäläinen (2016), and philosophy of 
technology more specifically, I limit myself in this paper to a conception of “empirical” and “empirical 
methodology” as it has been adopted within the field of experimental philosophy, thus retaining conti-
nuity. It seems to me that the acceptance and implementation of the methodology of experimental phi-
losophy is already a significant—if not a final—step toward a more empirically informed philosophy of 
technology.
6 I model this statement of intent after Earp et al.’s (2020) call for an experimental bioethics.
7 For an overview, see Knobe and Nichols (2017). I draw on their discussion of objections to experimen-
tal philosophy in this section.
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about technology have yet to be seriously studied, there is a prima facie reason to at 
least make the attempt to ascertain and better understand their function in the field.
Second, it has been argued against experimental philosophy that intuitions should 
not play a role in philosophy (see, e.g., Knobe & Nichols, 2017). One might grant 
that philosophers at times rely on intuitions, but nonetheless argue that this is unwar-
ranted. I want to point out here that, if one subscribes to the view that intuitions 
should not play a role in philosophy, then it naturally follows that one would also 
try to counteract reliance upon such intuitions. However, in order to do so, one must 
first identify such intuitions in order to get the argument off the ground. How could 
one attempt to eliminate reliance on intuitions without first setting out to detect intu-
itions and the role that that they in fact play in philosophical arguments? Yet this 
project, as should be clear, is not fundamentally opposed to that of experimental 
philosophy (Knobe & Nichols, 2017)—in fact, it falls squarely within the negative 
program that I describe in more detail later.
Third, it has been argued against experimental philosophy that it is not prop-
erly philosophy (e.g., Sorell, 2018). This is fundamentally a dispute about 
whether empirical work has a rightful place within the discipline of philoso-
phy. I follow Hartmann et al. (2013) in rejecting the terms of the debate about 
whether philosophical questions are (or should be) impervious to empirical 
research, allowing instead that experimental methods can complement—rather 
than displace—more purely analytical methods. The goal should be to maintain 
the rigor of philosophical reflection and to make good use of empirical data, 
while at the same time avoiding empirical naivety (Hämäläinen, 2016). As I 
will show, research in the philosophy of technology stands to gain much from 
an explicit engagement with empirical research. The question of how to demar-
cate the field of philosophy, while interesting, is not of concern to the current 
project, which seeks to generate new knowledge about philosophical issues sur-
rounding technology. Should a purist about philosophical method object that 
empirical methods have no place in philosophy, then this should not hamper the 
techxphi project. At worst, one might concede that experimental philosophy of 
technology is a hybrid discipline.
3.1  Two Programs
Experimental philosophy is commonly divided into different programs according 
to how these are positioned in relation to the traditional role of intuitions in ana-
lytic philosophy. The negative and positive programs are taken to be directly con-
cerned with intuitions—the former with undermining them in a “negative” way, 
and the latter with making progress in philosophy by examining them in a “posi-
tive” way (Knobe & Nichols, 2017). A third program is often identified, which 
is not so much concerned with the role of intuitions in philosophy traditionally, 
as with the attempt to “make progress on questions that are directly about peo-
ple’s thoughts and feelings themselves” (Knobe & Nichols, 2017, 5). Sytsma and 
Livengood (2016) also differentiate between intuitional and non-intuitional pro-
grams, according to whether research is or is not, respectively, about intuitions. 
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With this additional distinction, the positive and negative programs might be 
called intuitional, and the third non-intuitional.
In the following sections, I will limit myself to specifying two research pro-
grams for experimental philosophy of technology: a negative and a positive one. 
I will go into more detail later, but in the broadest terms, the difference between 
them is as follows. The negative program uses experimental methods and findings 
to debunk (or vindicate) intuitions, judgments, and so on in philosophy and ethics 
of technology. The positive program, on the other hand, uses experimental means 
more generally to further knowledge and advance debates in philosophy and eth-
ics of technology. The positive program is thus not necessarily tied to the project 
of debunking or vindication; it is more broadly concerned with making construc-
tive use of experimental data to inform techno-philosophical reflection.
Making distinctions between programs is a metaphilosophical endeavor. 
For present purposes, I am primarily interested in creating a space for concrete 
research topics in experimental philosophy of technology. To distinguish between 
different research programs provides a useful early schema toward this end, even 
if the research to be conducted in techxphi will likely fall only loosely within 
different programs and be subject to considerable overlap, as is the case in x-phi 
more generally (Knobe & Nichols, 2017). I adapt the two programs from x-phi in 
order to form a cohesive vision of techxphi that also preserves some continuity. 
The two programs are not, however, directly translated from, nor wholly trans-
latable to, current x-phi programs. Later work might relate the two programs in 
experimental philosophy of technology back to work in experimental philosophy. 
As it stands, however, I have chosen to make the respective divisions between 
negative and positive programs in order to maximize theoretical clarity and, per-
haps more importantly, to create as practicable a guide—and as clear a call to 
action—as possible.
Before moving on, something must be said about intuitions. There is a sub-
stantial philosophical literature about the nature, prevalence, and role of intui-
tions (see, e.g., Pust 2019). I cannot do justice to this rich area here. If the nature 
and the role of philosophical intuitions can be contested within experimental 
philosophy, then this can also be done within experimental philosophy of tech-
nology. Differently put, the success of an experimental philosophy of technology 
does not hinge on the adoption of any particular philosophical view of intuitions. 
For my part, in this paper, where I speak of intuitions, I follow Devitt (2015) in 
taking a minimally demanding view of intuitions that brings them close to our 
ordinary ability to recognize intuitions. Intuitions are, in short, what we ordinar-
ily take them to be.
3.2  The Negative Program
The negative program in x-phi centers on using experimental means to demonstrate 
that certain intuitions in philosophy are unreliable. Within the negative program of 
techxphi, this aim is extended in the attempt to debunk (or demonstrate as unreli-
able, unstable, biased, etc.) intuitions, judgments, and assumptions in philosophy of 
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technology. The “negative” refers to the role of research in this program, which is to 
critically examine latent intuitions and assumptions that may escape the arguments, 
concepts, and theories themselves. The operative metaphor here is that of “negative 
space”—by framing the space around the substantive arguments and theories in phi-
losophy and ethics of technology, which is present but often taken for granted or hid-
den from analysis, the hope is that a fuller image will emerge. Of course, when one 
makes explicit the implicit intuitions and assumptions that are at work in theoriz-
ing about technology, and when one sets out to experimentally test these intuitions 
and assumptions, there are two possible outcomes: The intuitions or assumptions in 
question may be debunked or vindicated.8 As such, the negative program of experi-
mental philosophy of technology includes not only debunking but also vindication 
efforts. Generally stated, the negative program involves experimental investigation 
of the intuitions and assumptions that feed into techno-philosophical arguments, in 
order to question or fortify their value.
I will focus on a specific line of research in ethics of technology in order to illus-
trate what the negative program of experimental philosophy of technology entails 
and how it can advance current debates. Consider the influential argument by 
Andreas Matthias that increasingly autonomous machines threaten to create a so-
called responsibility gap, which has initiated a line of responses regarding poten-
tial responsibility gaps in technology (e.g., Champagne & Tonkens, 2015; Nyholm, 
2018a; Tigard, 2020). The original argument by Matthias (2004) may be summa-
rized as follows:
[1] Traditionally, manufacturers/operators of machines are held morally/legally 
responsible for its operations.
[2] Highly autonomous machines create a novel situation where manufacturers/opera-
tors are in principle unable to predict the machine’s future behavior.
[3] One can only be held morally responsible/legally accountable for things one can 
control.
[4] Being unable to predict the machine’s future behavior means that manufacturers/
operators do not have control over that behavior.
Therefore,
[5] Manufacturers/operators cannot be morally responsible/liable for its operations.
Therefore,
[6] A socially undesirable responsibility gap emerges.
In the spirit of the negative program of experimental philosophy of technology, 
my claim is that there is an intuition at work in this argument—namely, that being 
8 The empirical findings may also provide inconclusive evidence, of course. However, one hopes that 
inconclusive findings will lead to additional, recalibrated research, which may then serve in the end to 
debunk or validate the respective intuition or assumption.
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unable to attribute responsibility to someone or something is problematic for indi-
viduals/society. Much of the argument seems to turn on this. This becomes clearer 
when we separate the theoretical from a more practical concern. If the possibility 
of the actions of highly autonomous machines being impervious to responsibility-
attribution were purely theoretical, but never actual—that is, if we somehow knew 
that we would never actually encounter a situation where we would have difficulties 
attributing moral responsibility—then much of the problematic nature of a would-be 
responsibility gap appears to fall away. The possibility of encountering a concrete 
situation where a responsibility gap in fact occurs and faces us is what gives the 
argument much of its force.
Even if one is not entirely convinced by this interpretation, looking at the argu-
ment in this way opens up a line of experimental philosophical research that can help 
us answer at least some pertinent questions about responsibility gaps. One might, for 
instance, conduct an experiment in which participants are presented with descrip-
tions of moral dilemmas in which machines cause harm and where the complexity 
of potential responsibility-attribution is systematically varied (i.e., in some cases, a 
responsible party will be easily identified; in others, with greater difficulty). How do 
participants deal with this complexity? Do people, in fact, have trouble attributing 
responsibility to the outcomes produced by highly autonomous machines?9 Another 
way to approach this would be to study the moral judgments of those who are 
already working with complex, highly autonomous machines. Using an experimen-
tal method, engineers, manufacturers, and operators of highly autonomous machines 
could be presented with moral dilemmas surrounding machines, harm, and respon-
sibility, in order to examine whether they—that is, people actually working closely 
with technology of this kind—have difficulties attributing responsibility in certain 
cases. If this research were to show that people (lay and professional) do not, as 
a matter of fact, encounter difficulties attributing responsibility even where highly 
complex systems are concerned, then this gives us reason to think that a responsibil-
ity gap is not as threatening a social issue as it has often been portrayed. Of course, 
to the extent that findings would show people to be unable to attribute moral respon-
sibility in such cases, then worries about a responsibility gap turn out to be better 
grounded.
The role of intuitions is also evident in a recent offshoot of the responsibility gap 
argument, namely the potential threat of a retribution gap (Danaher, 2016). Here, the 
argument is the following:
[1] Human beings are innate retributivists.
[2] As highly autonomous robots become ubiquitous, they will more frequently cause 
harm.
[3] When autonomous robots cause harm, people will seek targets for retributive 
blame.
9 I focus on negative outcomes as this has been the concern of much of the responsibility gap literature. 
It is an interesting question, however—and one that can and should be taken up by techxphi—whether 
there are systematic differences in people’s responsibility attributions according to whether the outcomes 
are negative or positive. Is there a threat of a responsibility gap when highly autonomous robots make 
good things happen? I leave this as an open question.
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[4] It is unlikely that either the robots or their makers will be eligible for retributive 
blame.
Therefore,
[5] People will seek retribution but fail to find appropriate targets.
Therefore,
[6] Increased robotization will lead to a retribution gap.
I have argued elsewhere (Kraaijeveld,  2020) that this argument essentially 
involves people’s retributive intuitions, and I have applied an evolutionary debunk-
ing argument to intuitions in these cases to argue that they are unjustified and thus 
ought not to be heeded. Although this approach at first glance may appear to fall 
within the negative program of experimental philosophy of technology, it was by 
means of an analytic argument that I attempted to undermine the relevant intui-
tions and, thereby, the retribution gap argument. I did not, in any case, make use of 
experimental findings. To qualify as experimental philosophy of technology, at least 
one empirical premise must be combined with at least one normative premise.10 The 
argument by Earp et al. (2020) for undermining or vindicating moral judgments in 
bioethics may be adapted here, in order to offer an approach to debunking/vindi-
cating moral intuitions and judgments in ethics of technology that can be readily 
and widely applied in the field. The Debunking/Vindication Argument (DVA) for 
experimental philosophy of technology may be stated as follows:
[1] Moral judgment M or moral intuition I is mainly influenced by factor/process F/P.
[2] F/P is an unreliable (reliable) or morally irrelevant (relevant) factor/process.
[3] So, moral judgment M or moral intuition I is unjustified (vindicated/not defeated).
It must be noted that the normative conclusion [3] is derived from an empirical 
premise [1] as well as a normative premise [2]. Empirical premise of this kind, based 
on experimental findings, combined with normative premises of this kind, provided 
by philosophical reflection, is how the negative program of experimental philoso-
phy of technology can advance knowledge about moral judgment within the ethics of 
technology.
To return to the retribution gap, there are at least two ways in which one might take 
a techxphi approach to the argument. On one hand, one could conduct an empirical 
study to examine whether people in fact respond with the kind of retributive intuitions 
and moral judgments of blame that make the retribution gap potentially problematic. It 
is worth carefully examining (i.e., empirically and systematically) both the nature and 
10 I do not mean to imply here that all of philosophy of technology is normative or that experimen-
tal philosophy of technology can always be formulated in normative terms (neither would be true). I 
merely want to suggest that, where normative issues are at stake in techno-philosophical arguments, then 
in order for it to count as experimental philosophy of technology, there must be some combination of nor-
mative and empirical premises. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this point.
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the scope of these intuitions and moral judgments in cases of harm caused by highly 
autonomous robots. If it turns out that people are not as prone to retributive intuitions 
and/or moral judgments of blame in these cases, then this would give us some reason 
to think that the social, legal, and moral ramifications of a retribution gap may not be as 
far-reaching as they have previously been considered.
On the other hand, a more sophisticated way of approaching the argument from the 
perspective of experimental philosophy of technology is to manipulate the relevant 
retributive intuitions and moral judgments in an experimental study, in order to test 
whether they are subject to unreliable and/or morally irrelevant factors or processes. 
Taking for granted that the intuitions and judgments that go into the retribution gap are 
as described, perhaps they are ultimately not to be heeded because they are empirically 
demonstrated to be unreliable, unstable, and etc. If it would turn out that retributive 
intuitions in cases of robot harm without clear candidates for moral blame were influ-
enced by, say, unreliable factor F or morally irrelevant process P, then one could use 
the DVA as described above to argue that the judgment based on factor F or process P 
in these cases means that the resulting moral judgment or moral intuition is not justi-
fied. If it turns out, for instance, that when a self-driving car crashes, people’s moral 
judgments about blame are significantly influenced by some morally irrelevant feature 
like the country of origin of the car manufacturer, then this would give us reason to 
question their validity.
In one sense, the move made in the second approach is similar to the one that I made 
in applying an evolutionary debunking argument (Kraaijeveld, 2020), in that both try to 
undermine in some way the status of the relevant intuitions/judgments. The important 
difference, as should be clear, is that applying the DVA inherently involves an empiri-
cal premise. This is what sets it apart as experimental and thus what makes it count as 
experimental philosophy of technology.
I have been able to cover only a few recent debates in ethics of technology, but the 
negative program generally, and the DVA in particular, can be applied to a host of other 
arguments, intuitions, and judgments in philosophy and ethics of technology.
3.3  The Positive Program
The positive program, which in experimental philosophy centers on making pro-
gress directly on all sorts of philosophical issues, can for experimental philosophy of 
technology be viewed largely as a similar effort to experimentally investigate intui-
tions, assumptions, thoughts, emotions, concepts, and so on that are relevant to top-
ics in philosophy and ethics of technology.11 What are the intuitions that come into 
11 I want to reiterate here that I am sympathetic to a wide array of empirical methods in philosophy 
generally and in philosophy of technology in particular, including those that do not strictly fall within the 
“experimental” bracket of experimental philosophy (e.g., narrative or hermeneutic approaches). I have 
chosen this methodology not only because it promises new insights and lines of research for philosophy 
of technology, but also because it importantly extends the project of experimental philosophy. Neverthe-
less, I do not think there is any reason why the positive project as I describe it could not accommodate 
those who seek to gain a richer understanding in philosophy of technology, for instance by investigating 
the “moral present” (Hämäläinen, 2016). In other words, should empirically minded researchers who are 
not experimentally inclined (in the sense given to this by experimental philosophy) wish to take on the 
positive project or identify with it, then they would be welcome indeed.
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play when we think about novel and emerging technologies? How are our moral 
judgments about technology related to the underlying cognitive and psychological 
processes that give rise to them? Do certain ethical theories about technology rely 
on the existence of (previously unexamined) empirical matters of fact? The aim of 
the positive program is to make progress on these and other questions surrounding 
technology. The nominal “positive” is indicative of the positive spirit of contribu-
tion; this program may thus be seen as wider in scope than the negative program, 
which focuses more narrowly on debunking and vindication attempts.
There are many potentially interesting lines of research that could be taken up 
under the auspices of the positive program of experimental philosophy of technol-
ogy. I will specify two major tasks, which may be pursued separated but will ide-
ally be integrated in a meaningful way. First, there is the descriptive task of prob-
ing people’s intuitions and judgments about arguments, theories, and dilemmas in 
philosophy and ethics of technology. This includes folk intuitions and judgments as 
well as those of experts. There are many areas in ethics and philosophy of tech-
nology where intuitions appear, at least on the surface, to play an important role. 
Whether we are considering the introduction and ramifications of novel technolo-
gies or products of technological advances like cultured or in vitro meat (Van der 
Weele & Tramper, 2014), accident-algorithms for unavoidable collisions of self-
driving cars (Nyholm & Smids, 2016),12 the possibility of robots being good col-
leagues (Nyholm & Smids, 2019) or being objects for sexual gratification (Danaher 
et al., 2017) or mutual love (Nyholm & Frank, 2017), or what the role of technology 
ought to be in a good society (Brey, 2018), intuitions about many of these questions 
will play an important role. To explicate them in a systematic way, through empiri-
cal investigation, will add to our knowledge about these questions and will assist in 
formulating new ones.
To give a more elaborate example, one area in which experimental philosophy 
of technology may be especially productive is in discussions surrounding techno-
moral change. The main claim of the technomoral change approach is that technol-
ogy co-shapes many if not all aspects of society, including moral norms and values 
(Swierstra et  al., 2009). The notion of technomoral change readily lends itself to 
the combination of empirical investigation and philosophical analysis that charac-
terizes experimental philosophy of technology. For, in order to know precisely how 
technology co-shapes moral norms and values, one must know at least some of the 
empirical matters of fact—about the nature, scope, and direction of changes in peo-
ple’s moral frameworks and about how technology acts as a driving force. Although 
rare, some good empirical-normative work has already been conducted in this area. 
Olya Kudina and Peter-Paul Verbeek (2018), for instance, have studied online dis-
cussions about the “explorer” version of Google Glass in order to make progress 
on the ethical variant of the Collingridge dilemma. Additionally, the proposed use 
of alternative technomoral scenarios to inform public deliberation about New and 
12 When it comes to  people’s intuitions about how self-driving cars should respond to particular sce-
narios and dilemmas, some important work is already being done as part of the Moral Machine project at 
the MIT Media Lab. For the Moral Machine experiment, see Awad et al. (2018). The online project can 
be found here: https:// moral machi ne. net. For a discussion, see also the section on “Empirical Ethics” in 
Nyholm (2018b).
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Emerging Science and Technology (NEST) for Technology Assessment (Swierstra 
et  al., 2009) is a promising way of prompting moral intuitions and judgments on 
a wide range of relevant issues, which appears closely aligned with the goals of a 
descriptive experimental philosophy of technology program that uses vignettes and 
moral dilemmas to elicit intuitions. Where experimental philosophy of technology 
can make its unique contribution, however, is in not taking the relevant intuitions 
and judgments at face value, but by experimentally manipulating the scenarios so 
as to learn about the factors that are involved in producing these intuitions and judg-
ments. For instance, are they subject to situational factors, order effects, or fram-
ing effects? Which psychological processes underlie different moral judgments in 
these scenarios? All of the methodological tools of experimental philosophy may be 
applied here to categorize and scrutinize the relevant intuitions and judgments.
As in experimental ethics more widely, the use of indirect experiments may give 
us insight into “the nature of some capacity or judgment: for example, whether cer-
tain types of moral dilemmas engage particular areas of the brain,” whereas direct 
experiments can “investigate whether a claim held (or denied) by philosophers is 
corroborated or falsified,” which “might mean investigating an intuition and whether 
it is as widely shared as philosophers claim, or it might mean investigating the claim 
that a certain behavior or trait is widespread or that two factors covary” (Alfano 
et al., 2018). If the purpose is to show that the relevant intuitions and judgments are 
unreliable or biased in some way, then this research may be tallied under the nega-
tive program. However, there is no reason why assessing the scope and sensitivity of 
moral judgments about technomoral change, say, or about self-driving cars causing 
certain kinds of harm, has to involve the attempt to debunk the judgments in ques-
tion. To the extent that we really just want to know about these judgments, or about 
whether intuitions are in fact as philosophers of technology have taken them to be, 
then this may be seen as an important descriptive task in its own right.
Second, there is the normative task of using empirical findings to support norma-
tive claims about the subject at hand. Some inchoate work has already been done in 
this area, even if this was not under the name of experimental philosophy of tech-
nology.13 For example, Kudina (2019) has recently used empirical methods as well 
as philosophical analysis to investigate the complex interactions between ethics and 
technology. As previously mentioned, research into technomoral change that uses 
technomoral scenarios has also been receptive to the value of empirical input, even 
though one may still press this work to make the role of empirical research more 
prominent in discussions surrounding the scenarios and the conclusions to which 
they give rise (cf. Boenink et al., 2010). Research of this kind remains rare. Given 
that technologies can “rob moral routines of their self-evident invisibility and turn 
them into topics for discussion, deliberation, modification, and reassertion” (Swier-
stra & Rip, 2007, 6), experimental philosophy of technology is well-suited to take 
on the task of elucidating the (changes in) moral routines, norms, and values sur-
rounding technology, in an effort to strengthen normative conclusions about what 
the role of technologies should be given what they are or what they do within 
13 No one, as far as I know, has explicitly taken this approach to date.
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particular practices. Think, for example, of people’s lived experiences in relation 
to or as affected by technologies. By studying people’s actual experiences (e.g., 
through qualitative research; see Andow, 2016), one can obtain knowledge that tran-
scends the merely observational or anecdotal; and by documenting the experiences 
(e.g., of injustice or systematic biases), one can move toward conceptualizing and 
implementing changes for the better.14
4  Why Techxphi?
While I think that the forgoing discussion of the different programs, respective 
examples, and suggestions about further and future research already does much to 
demonstrate the value of an experimental philosophical approach to technology, 
there are several more general arguments that speak to its potential value.
First, techxphi can provide a unifying methodology for a number of subfields 
within philosophy of technology. It can do so at the most general level, where two 
different approaches—humanities and analytic—are often distinguished (Frans-
sen et  al., 2018). Given that I have focused much of the discussion (1) on the 
role of intuitions, and (2) on the role of intuitions within ethics of technology, it 
may appear that experimental philosophy of technology is best suited to what Carl 
Mitcham (1994, 39) has called humanities philosophy of technology, which is com-
mitted to the “primacy of the humanities over technology” and studies technology 
from within the social sciences and humanities. As such, work in this area is con-
cerned first and foremost with the moral, social, and political aspects of technol-
ogy. Within the analytic approach to philosophy of technology, on the other hand, 
technology itself has primacy and is viewed as a phenomenon of inherent interest, 
aside from what it might mean to and for human beings. It must be remembered, 
however, that I have focused on moral intuitions primarily for reasons of space. 
Experimental philosophy, as a methodology for investigating philosophical prob-
lems, has also already contributed to major issues in analytical philosophy, as evi-
denced by work done in formal semantics (e.g., Liao & Meskin, 2017; Cariani & 
Rips, 2017; see also Franssen et al., 2018) to offer but one example. There is no 
reason to think that experimental philosophy of technology cannot likewise further 
knowledge and sharpen debates in analytic philosophy of technology. In this way, 
then, experimental philosophy of technology can provide a much-needed methodo-
logical bridge between traditional analytic and humanities approaches to philoso-
phy of technology.
Within ethics of technology, techxphi can also provide a unifying methodol-
ogy across different applied ethics research programs. This is important, because 
as Philip Brey has pointed out, “very little work is being done to advance the field 
of technology ethics theoretically or methodologically” (2010, 44). In the same 
way that the application of a particular moral principle may usefully be extended 
14 I am here still advocating the experimental methods as they have been used in experimental philoso-
phy; but this seems to me a point at which the thin line may meaningfully be crossed from such methods 
into more descriptive, nonexperimental, qualitative methods.
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to diverse and novel technologies, so experimental philosophy of technology can 
provide a means of gaining knowledge that is not tied to one particular technol-
ogy (e.g., gene drives or reproductive technologies). As a specific methodology, 
experimental philosophy of technology constitutes a novel approach to technol-
ogy ethics. By its espousal of empirical investigation of moral intuitions and its 
insistence on tying experimental findings to normative philosophical reflection, 
it offers an approach to ethics of technology alongside others—be it cultural and 
political approaches, engineering ethics approaches, or approaches that focus on 
the ethics of specific technologies.
Experimental philosophy of technology also has implications for fields adjacent 
and related to philosophy of technology as broadly construed, such as Technology 
Assessment (TA), Science and Technology Studies (STS), and human–robot inter-
action (HRI), to name but a few of the more obvious candidates. The lack of a sys-
tematic attempt to investigate intuitions in these disciplines may be surprising—not 
least in the field of HRI, where the study of interactions between humans and robots 
promises to offer a productive ground for testing intuitions as well as a clear role 
for empirically informed philosophy. Some recent work in this area, however, does 
already appear to be within the spirit of experimental philosophy of technology as I 
have outlined it, even though it has not been explicitly conducted or characterized as 
such.15 Nijssen et al. (2019), for instance, have experimentally investigated whether 
anthropomorphic appearance and attributions modulated utilitarian decision-making 
about robotic agents, and have found that when people attribute affective states to 
robots, they are less likely to sacrifice them in order to save humans. de Graaf and 
Malle (2019) have experimentally tested people’s mental state ascriptions to robots, 
and found that people use the same conceptual toolbox of behavior explanations for 
human and robot agents, thus indicating inferences of intentionality and mind, even 
though people applied those tools somewhat differently to explain robot as com-
pared to human behavior. This is the kind of research that, I think, can and should be 
part of a much more systematic experimental philosophical approach to how human 
beings perceive and interact with robots and AI.
Additionally, phenomenological and postphenomenological approaches to 
technology, the latter of which has in any case been marked by an “empirical 
turn” and aims to “empirically analyze how particular technologies as “the things 
themselves” mediate the relation between humans and their world” (Zwier et al., 
2016, 314), can also benefit from engagement with the proposed experimental 
methodology to further its own ends. In turn, testing some of the concepts and 
arguments that underlie (post)phenomenology may provide a fertile ground for 
potential advances in experimental philosophy of technology.
Second, techxphi can offer a means of generating knowledge across differ-
ent fields without necessarily requiring the specialized knowledge of such fields. 
The fundamentally interdisciplinary nature of experimental philosophy of tech-
nology means that it can provide a dynamic and productive meeting ground for 
researchers from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds. One imagines psy-
chologists, neuroscientist, and cognitive scientists with an interest in normative 
15 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this research to my attention.
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questions about technology collaborating with empirically minded ethicists and 
philosophers of technology in order to investigate questions about, say, how and 
why people arrive at particular moral judgments about new technologies, or about 
how and why particular technologies influence the way we think about and treat 
ourselves and others. This point is also relevant to the previously sketched rela-
tion between analytic and humanities philosophy of technology. As a method-
ology, a collaborative techxphi project can probe the arguments of analytically 
inclined philosophers of technology just as it can test the claims made by those 
working on technology from within a humanities approach—all without necessar-
ily requiring specialized background in the respective disciplines. As in so many 
collaborative efforts, of course, dialog is key.
Third, given that intuitions within philosophy of technology and intuitions 
about technology more generally are relatively unfamiliar territory from the per-
spective of our evolutionary history as human beings, it is important in and of 
itself to be conscious of the role that these intuitions might play. To the extent 
that experimental philosophy of technology uncovers and scrutinizes relevant 
intuitions, it can provide a body of knowledge relevant both to philosophical 
work on technology that has already been conducted (e.g., through the negative 
program as criticism of the roles that intuitions have played), but also—and per-
haps especially—with regard to the future (e.g., through the positive program by 
mapping the functions of intuitions on an ongoing basis). There is a prima facie 
reason to scrutinize our intuitions when it comes to thinking about technology. 
When one is dealing with evolutionarily unfamiliar territory—as our technology-
laden society is today—our intuitions are less likely to be apt to our environment 
and are thus less likely to be reliable guides for thought and action. In the end, 
from our current vantage point, one can only speculate about the myriad ways in 
which technology will develop and influence, let alone shape, human existence. 
To keep a finger close to the pulse of our intuitions in an ongoing attempt to 
understand the impact of technology on our thinking—and our thinking on tech-
nology—is a contribution that experimental philosophy of technology is well-
positioned to make. If experimental philosophy has successfully garnered new 
insights for a host of philosophical disciplines, as I believe it has, then the burden 
of proof should be on those who would deny that it has anything to offer philoso-
phy of technology; especially given the unsettled, perpetually changing, and, in 
many ways, decisive nature of its subject matter. Should this paper result in an 
increased self-awareness about intuitions among philosophers of technology, then 
it will already have succeeded in no small measure.
5  Conclusion
The field of experimental philosophy has, through its engagement with experimen-
tal methods, become an important means of obtaining knowledge about the intui-
tions, concepts, and assumptions that lie behind philosophical arguments, problems, 
and theories across a wide variety of philosophical disciplines. In this paper, I have 
extended this burgeoning research program to philosophy of technology, providing 
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both a general outline of how an experimental philosophy of technology might look 
and a more specific methodology and set of programs that engages with research 
already being conducted in the field. I have responded to potential objections to an 
experimental philosophy of technology and I have argued for a number of unique 
strengths of the approach. Aside from engaging with work that already involves 
intuitions in techno-philosophical research, a booming experimental philosophy 
of technology research program can offer a unifying methodology for a diverse set 
of subfields, a way of generating knowledge across disciplines without necessarily 
requiring specialized knowledge; and, at the very least, it can make those working in 
philosophy of technology—and those in society who engage with technology, which 
is all of us—more mindful of the intuitions about technology that we may, rightly or 
wrongly, hold.
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